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Student Comment
The Failure of International Commodity
Agreements: Forms, Functions, and
Implications
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment began working towards the creation of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO). Plans for the imposition of the NIEO included
extensive use of International Commodity Agreements (ICA's) as a
means by which Lesser Developed Countries (LDC's) could become
more involved in world markets and increase the living conditions of
their citizens.1 Less than thirty years later, ICA's are nearly extinct.
This Note examines the history of ICA's, especially in relation to oil,
tin, coffee, and sugar; analyzes the market factors that have under-
mined the success of ICA's; and illustrates some of the ramifications of




Attempts at international commodity control began around the
time of World War I. Economic conditions during the war increased
general economic awareness and created the perception that commodi-
ty price control could be feasible. In addition, market inconsistencies
and instabilities bolstered the trend towards market control.2 Initial
efforts in this area came in the form of non-governmental, producer
agreements that demonstrated only limited success and were almost
universally destroyed by the Great Depression. However, they did pro-
vide the groundwork for the more comprehensive governmental control
schemes that developed after the Great Depression.'
1. BRANiSLAV Gosovic, UNCTAD: CONFLIcT AND CoMPOMIsE 28 (1971).
2. ALTON D. LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMoDITY AGREEMENTS 38-39 (1975).
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS xii (International
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By the 1940's, International Commodity Agreements were being
examined and constructed at the governmental level. Since these
agreements were driven primarily by large fluctuations in basic com-
modity prices, they tended to focus primarily in the creation of price
stability.' In 1948, the Havana Charter was drafted in order to pro-
vide an organizational framework for a new International Trade Orga-
nization. Although plans for this organization eventually foundered,
the Havana Charter provided another important basis upon which
later International Trade Agreements (ITA's) were built.6
Two important trends developed over the next three decades.
First, in the 1950's, early ICA's, which had focused on price stabili-
zation, began to be more concerned about price boosting through
oligopolistic market control. Second, by the creation of the United Na-
tions Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the
usage (or at least contemplation) of ICA's had intensified considerably.
Support for ICA's was especially strong among the Lesser Developed
Countries (LDC's), which hoped to improve their positions in the global
market.'
The early 1970's was a particularly important time period in com-
modity market history due to the simultaneous impact of a sharp com-
modity price boom and consequent collapse of many commodity mar-
kets, the unforeseen impact of the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), and the formal recognition by the United Na-
tions for the need of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
With respect to the NIEO, UNCTAD adopted the Integrated Program
for Commodities (IPC) in 1976 in response to renewed price fluctua-
tions in the international commodity markets. This program was de-
signed to promote stability in long term commodity development by
creating or renewing ICA's. However, only minimal achievements have
been made since the adoption of the IPC, largely because of increased
resistance to the implementation of the program by industrialized
countries and the increasing difficulty of renegotiating ICA's.7
During the 1980's and early 1990's, there has been a general
downturn in the overall use and effectiveness of ICA's. In many com-
modities, this has been the result of increasing world production in
combination with static demand. Accordingly, there has been a general
reduction in commodity prices with a corresponding loss in bargaining
Labour Office [of Canada], 1943) [hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS].
4. Id. at xix.
5. ABDULQAWI A. YUSAF, The Legal Framework for Stable, Renumerative and
Equitable Commodity Prices in International Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRES-
ENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic ORDER 122, 125 (Detlev Chr. Dicke &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988)
6. L BARANYAI & J.C. MILLS, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 9
(1963).
7. YUSAF, supra note 5, at 129-31.
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position for the producers of primary products. In addition, the imposi-
tion of ICA's has been regularly opposed by developed countries, which
have come to regard them as economic threats.8
Consequently, the future of ICA's is uncertain. The recent dissolu-
tion of the USSR is likely to improve levels of trade in the global mar-
ket, at the same time that the relative strength of the western indus-
trialized countries increases. However, recent clashes between devel-
oped and developing countries may indicate either a shift towards
greater integration and a more active role on an explicit level by the
governments of the west or a widening of the rift between the devel-
oped and developing countries.
B. Function
As the discussion above illustrates, the function that ICA's serve,
or perhaps should serve, depends greatly on one's perspective. ICA's
can be divided into three main categories. The great majority of the
ICA's that remain in operation retain no ability to directly effect the
operation of their respective markets. These ICA's provide important
fora for discussion, supply crucial information to the market place, and
provide needed market surveillance. However, the roles they play in
the world commodity markets are essentially limited. The second type
of ICA focuses on co-operation in production, consumption, and devel-
opment of rare commodities; agreements of this kind include arrange-
ments in commodities such as jute and tropical timber. These agree-
ments are generally of relatively limited scope and play only a relative-
ly minor role in the market place.! The third and arguably most im-
portant type of agreement includes ICA's, such as OPEC, that have
price support/control mechanisms built into their structure. These
ICA's play much more important and active roles in the market place;
however, the number of these organizations has been dwindling in
recent years.10
While the stated objectives for the imposition of ICA's range from
security to health, many of these concerns should be considered "win-
dow dressing." In actuality, the goals of most ICA's are relatively
straight forward.1" When viewed from a traditional market perspec-
tive, commodity agreements essentially serve two primary functions:
stabilizing prices and markets, and increasing income to producers. 12
8. AMER S. ARAIM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC ORDER 212 (1991).
9. YUSAF, supra note 5, at 132.
10. International Commodity Agreements in Decay (part 1), AUSTRALIAN FINAN-
CIAL REVIEW, May 24, 1985, at 2, (hereinafter Agreements in Decay], available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
11. LAW, supra note 2, at 75-79.
12. JERE R. BEHRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS: AN EVALUATION
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These goals make trade agreements politically controversial because
they are a method by which LDC's may be able to better control their
economies and improve their positions in the world economy in rela-
tionship to industrialized countries."3
Within the objective of stabilization lies another contentious issue.
The prices of basic commodities have often fluctuated widely
throughout history, causing extensive social harm to Third World la-
borers and farmers." UNCTAD has consistently endorsed the imposi-
tion of ICA's as one means of mitigating these fluctuations. However,
Alton Law, a professor of economics specializing in ICA's, notes that
closer analysis indicates that the effect of ICA's on stabilization may
be overstated for several reasons:
First, price stability has been greatly increased and instability has
been exaggerated in the first place, especially with respect to its
relationship to the LDC's. Second, that instability which remains is
so heavily dependent upon noneconomic considerations that its
expectations of elimination by manipulation of economic aspects are
slim. Third, one must insist that specific facets of each commodity
situation be examined with considerable care to determine the
desirability and detailed nature of any control effort.'
Further, even if relative price stability is achieved, it is uncertain
whether the revenue stability desired by LDC's will follow."
If price stability were the only objective of ICA's, then they would
probably be much more prevalent. Industrialized countries desire price
stability because it reduces the requirement for large stocks, and re-
sulting high storage costs, due to reduced uncertainty. However, even
if ICA's guaranteed these benefits, the price controls would be likely to
offset any economic gain to LDCs. 7
As a result, price control is the most controversial issue over
which producing and consuming countries differ. Traditional market
economics postulate that market prices will be set by the interaction of
supply and demand for each individual product. If this hypothesis is
valid, the producers of basic commodities may only increase price lev-
els if they can engage in monopolistic/oligopolistic behavior. Whether
producers may do so depends upon the specific attributes of the partic-
ular product and its associated market.
An accurate evaluation of the use of monopoly power by LDC's
will not necessarily dismiss ICA's as inefficient. Proponents of ICA's
OF THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAMME 21 (1977).
13. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 18.
14. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at xi.
15. LAW, supra note 2, at 17.
16. Id. at 77.
17. Id. at 79.
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cite modern theories of economics, such as The Theory of the Second
Best, to demonstrate that resources will be maximized, at least in a
relative way, when producers and consumers employ equal levels of
monopoly power. In addition, some commentators have argued that the
degree of disparity in bargaining position between the industrialized
countries and the LDC's makes traditional market analysis inapplica-
ble. 8 Nevertheless, it is clear that the profound difference in interests
between consumers and producers will remain a large stumbling block
in the implementation of ICA's.
C. Forms of Market Control
There are three means of achieving commodity control in the
global market. Each may be used alone or, more typically, together in
strategic combination. The first method is to form a multilateral con-
tract between international sellers and buyers of commodities. Mul-
tilateral contracts usually allow a number of sellers to coordinate their
efforts either alone or subject to input from one or more buyers. 9
Second, buffer stocks are often used to regulate price and business
fluctuations by buying commodities in times of excess and selling in
times of scarcity.' However, effective buffer stock programs are diffi-
cult to maintain because they require not only adequate storage facili-
ties and careful management but also the continuous, adequate supply
of capital necessary to finance the buffer pool itself. In addition, at-
tempts to use buffer stocks to maintain unrealistic commodity prices in
the long-term is most likely to lead to either a "disposal crisis" or ex-
haustion of the buffer pool capital reserves. 1
Third, trade restrictions and quotas are frequently used to control
the commodity market. These agreements are important both because
they are widely used and because they allow the state to unilaterally
set ceilings on the importation or exportation of commodities. However,
these arrangements can be problematic because they are often affected
by political, non-economic disruptions, and they tend to retard the
development of low cost competition. As a result, the use of restrictions
and quotas has been criticized on economic grounds because of their
potential for creating global misallocation of resources and inefficient
levels of output.'
18. BEHRMAN, supra note 12, at 9-10.
19. LAW, supra note 2, at 70-72.
20. Id. at 72-73.
21. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 65-66.
22. LAW, supra note 2, at 73.
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III. INDIVIDUAL COMMODITIES
Although a detailed analysis of every major commodity is beyond
the scope of this paper, a cursory review of at least some real examples
is necessary to illustrate further discussions on ICA's. Recent history,
structure and function of several major agreements have been detailed
below in order to provide a better framework of analysis. To that end,
some effort has been made to select commodities that have experienced
substantial control efforts. Besides the commodities listed below, con-
trol efforts have been attempted in a variety of other markets includ-
ing wool, tea, beef, bauxite, rubber, and wheat.
A. Oil
1. Chronology
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, oil production for
the United States and European interests dominated the world market
for at least two reasons. First, increasing trade and building industry
created a greater need for a continuous and secure supply of oil in
developing countries. Second, the exploitation of oil reserves was ex-
tremely costly and expensive. Since the countries that had the poten-
tial to produce oil could not generally afford the start-up costs, oil
interests were largely controlled and manipulated by the large corpora-
tions from the U.S. and Europe that had the resources and technology
required to access the oil deposits.'
The Standard Oil Trust, founded in 1877, quickly became domi-
nant in both the American and international oil markets. However, the
development of American anti-trust law caused Standard Oil to splin-
ter into more than thirty separate companies, five of which - Esso,
Mobil, Standard of California, Gulf, and Texaco - remained important
players in the world market. The European oil market developed in a
similar manner with two corporations, Shell and British Petroleum,
eventually winning the largest share of the European market.'
Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, market competition in-
creased, and the seven largest oil corporations - the so-called "seven
sisters" - attempted to find ways to stabilize oil production and pric-
ing. The resulting negotiations culminated in 1928 with the Pact of
Achnacarry, which by 1930 involved all of the major oil corporations.
Acting under the terms of the pact, the major oil corporations maxi-
mized their retained earnings and exercised considerable bargaining
power by combining a high degree of vertical and horizontal integra-
tion with oligarchic trade practices. Consequently, the major oil corpo-
23. IAN SKEET, OPEC: TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PRICES AND PoLITIcs 4 (Richard
Eden ed., 1988).




rations were at least majority partners in trade relations with the
major oil producing countries until 1960.'
The relationship between the oil corporations and their host coun-
tries was frequently confrontational. Corporate decisions designed to
maximize profits often conflicted with national security interests of the
individual states. In addition, the secrecy with which these decisions
were made often left the host with a great deal of uncertainty. As a
result, the increasing importance of oil as an international commodity
led to an increased desire, and ability, of the host countries to create
changes in the international oil arena."
The formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) began at the First Arab Petroleum Congress in 1959 with
the Maadi Pact. The Maadi Pact was a confidential but relatively in-
formal arrangement between the representatives of Venezuela, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, designed to promote discussions con-
cerning the production of oil. In addition, the arrangement called for
the construction of an "Arab Petroleum Organization."'
A combination of political and economic factors contributed to the
subsequent formation of OPEC in September of 1960. Political dis-
agreements between President Nasser of Egypt, who dominated the
Arab League, and General Quassem of Iraq, who wished to create an
organization outside of the Arab League, motivated Quassem to issue
invitations to a conference in Iraq to discuss oil issues.' Two key eco-
nomic factors also contributed. First, the bargaining strength of the
members of the Pact of Achnacarry was weakened by the gradual in-
troduction of independent and nationally owned oil corporations into
the international market combined with the opening of a market for
them to exploit, Libya's oil fields. Second, increased competition in the
international oil market and governmental protection of the American
domestic oil market prompted a widespread decline in the price of oil,
culminating in a drastic price cut in 1960.'
OPEC's initial impact upon the international oil market was rela-
tively minor due to several factors. First, the demand for oil in the
1960's was much lower than it became in the 1970's. Second, the bar-
gaining position held by the oil corporations was still relatively strong.
Third, dissention between the members of OPEC prevented them from
presenting a united front until 1964.' In addition, increased produc-
tion and competition world wide led to even further reductions in oil
25. MOHAMMED E. AHRARI, OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT 11-12 (1986).
26. Id. at 13.
27. GHANEM, 8upra note 24, at 21.
28. Id. at 28.
29. SKEET, supra note 23, at 5, 17.
30. Id. at 33, 245.
1994
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
prices."1
By 1971, OPEC's position had changed significantly, and it began
to be able to negotiate much more effectively. OPEC's membership had
increased to a total of ten members, adding Qatar (1961), Indonesia
(1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), and Algeria
(1969),' and it had increased its market share to 50.6 percent.' At
the same time, global demand for oil had more than doubled, from
around thirty-six million barrels per day in 1960 to in excess of seven-
ty-seven million barrels per day in 1970." The closure of the Suez
Canal in 1967 cut off a major trade route to the west and further in-
creased oil scarcity. Finally, Libya's ability to effectively negotiate with
the smaller, independent corporations led to increased confidence with-
in OPEC that concerted action could be used effectively against the
larger corporations.'
The Tehran Agreement of 1970 contained the first substantially
effective resolutions made by OPEC members: 1) increased income tax
rates; 2) the elimination of posting price disparities; 3) the establish-
ment of uniform increases in price; 4) a new "gravity" escalation sys-
tem; 5) the elimination of all OPEC allowances granted to oil compa-
nies; and 6) continued support for Libya's actions." The ensuing nego-
tiations with the oil corporations, which culminated in the Tehran
Agreement in February of 1971, effectively began the transition from a
buyer's to a seller's market.37
In 1973, in response to western support for Israel, OPEC stopped
consulting with the oil corporations, began unilaterally setting oil
prices, and cut production by more than 900 billion barrels per day.
Downstream, these actions tripled the transfer price between produc-
ers and refineries, a cost which was passed along to consumers world-
wide.' The result was a worldwide "oil crisis," which dramatically
impacted industrialized areas such as Western Europe and the United
States where both oil consumption and dependence on foreign oil had
been steadily increasing.' The "oil crisis" also interacted profoundly
with the world economy. Developing countries that had little potential
for export related income quickly accumulated large oil related debts, a
31. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 80.
32. SKEET, supra note 23, at 238.
33. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 203.
34. SKEET, supra note 23, at 245.
35. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 33.
36. Id. at 48.
37. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 128.
38. Id. at 144-45.
39. See generally Dario Scuka, O.P.E.C.: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, Background, Review and Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
(CRS No. 74-189 E, 1974) [hereinafter O.P.E.C.] (discussing the impact of petroleum
price increases in the U.S.).
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situation that was further aggravated by the ensuing economic reces-
sion and relatively high inflation rates of the mid-1970's.'
By 1974, the cohesion of OPEC with respect to pricing policy had
degenerated due to the different desires of its member countries. The
"price hawks" advocated further price increases designed to bolster
profit levels in the face of inflation. This position is ironic, since in-
creases in the prices of petroleum have been frequently cited as a ma-
jor source of rising inflation in the world economy.4 1 The more moder-
ate states - Saudi Arabia, in particular - felt that OPEC's continued
success was linked inexorably to stability and prosperity in the world
economy and that further increases in oil prices were unwarranted.
The disagreements were exacerbated by a decline in the demand for
oil, resulting partly from the implementation of conservation policies
by non-oil producing nations and partly from the continuing recession.
As a result, a rift formed between Saudi Arabia, which controlled the
most abundant oil reserves, and the rest of the OPEC membership.42
At the same time that OPEC was struggling to maintain a cohe-
sive front, the industrialized nations began to attempt to find ways to
combat the "predatory price increases." Accordingly, the International
Energy Agency (IEA) was established, largely through the efforts of
the U.S. foreign policy under the direction of Dr. Henry Kissinger.
Specifically, the IEA provided for the creation of a sharing mechanism
to deal with oil supply disruptions; the establishment of energy policies
that would reduce dependency on oil; and an information system that
would enable IEA governments to understand better and to monitor
the oil market."
The IEA initially received only marginal support, largely because
of the economic importance of OPEC, whose members regarded the
IEA as confrontational. IEA also received little support because of the
self-serving attitudes taken by each of the oil importing countries.
However, the International Energy Policy, created by the IEA, greatly
improved cooperation between the Western nations.'
Despite OPEC's ability to control oil price, its oil pricing policy
has been characterized by most commentators as erratic after 1974.
There are several reasons for this. First, the increase in wealth caused
many oil producing states to embark on ambitious domestic improve-
ment plans. The objectives of these plans, in turn, required the mainte-
nance of high levels of oil export related income, the lack of which
leads to increased debt and destabilization. Second, the inability of
40. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 76.
41. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 21.
42. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 149.
43. SKEET, supra note 23, at 119.
44. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 98.
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OPEC to effectively coordinate oil production has resulted in relatively
poor control over the supply of oil compared to that exercised by the oil
corporations before 1960. Third, since OPEC countries are highly de-
pendent on oil exports, their income is highly vulnerable to policy
changes in foreign industry. Fourth, OPEC's increased income has
resulted in massive investment in foreign countries. Accordingly, in-
creases in oil prices adversely affect OPEC's holdings in non-oil pro-
ducing countries.'
During the 1980's, OPEC's economic strength declined consider-
ably. This decline is generally attributed to the reduction in the global
demand for oil brought about by conservation programs instituted in
oil importing nations. However, this factor alone is insufficient to ex-
plain the size of OPEC's loss of power since global consumption of oil
declined by only about two percent from 1974 to 1986.' Instead, two
other factors played major roles in OPEC's decline. First, the dramatic
increase in the production of oil by non-OPEC countries resulted in a
decline in OPEC's global market share by almost twenty percent from
1970 to 1984.' Second, effective manipulation by the IEA and gener-
ally poor market conditions have further decreased OPEC's ability to
control the international oil market.'
8
OPEC's future remains uncertain. On the brighter side, at least
for OPEC, oil consumption has been rising since the late 1980's, a
trend which is expected to continue. Indeed, some analysts have pre-
dicted that OPEC's share of the U.S. oil import market will swell to
more than fifty percent by 1995 because of OPEC's control of the most
extensive known oil resources.' Along with increased market share,
OPEC's technological and oil processing capabilities, its negotiating
skills, and its understanding of economics have improved.'
On the other hand, OPEC's market share continued to decline
through 1992,"' and some economic analysts have projected that cer-
tain individual OPEC nations are likely to encounter substantial eco-
nomic challenges in the near future.52 These downturns could become
worse because of the inability of OPEC to overcome the differences in
opinion among its members concerning pricing policy objectives. This
point is underscored by recent willingness of Saudi Arabia to enter into
45. ABBAS ALNASRAWI, OPEC IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 114-15 (1985).
46. SKEET, supra note 23, at 245.
47. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 203.
48. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 190.
49. Bernard A. Gelb, Oil Imports from OPEC: Recent and Projected Trends, 6
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS No. 88-558 E, Aug. 11, 1988).
50. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 20-22.
51. Gulf States: The Confrontation to Come, MIDDLE EAST MAGAZINE, Mar. 1,
1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Gulf States].
52. FARID ABOLFATHI ET AL., THE OPEC MARKET TO 1985 17 (1977).
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bilateral negotiations with ARAMCO." Finally, the recent invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq has further widened the rift between Iraq, which has
been a traditional proponent of price increases, and Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, traditional moderates.
Finally, the rising discord within OPEC has led to increased im-
portance in a number of other organizations, such as the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC), which includes the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. If relations between the mem-
bers of OPEC do not improve, the GCC could play an increasingly
important role in the oil market."
2. Form and Function
Chapter I, Article 2 of the treaty signed by the five founding mem-
bers of OPEC provides for three principle objectives:
(A) The principle aim of the Organization shall be the co-ordination
and unification of the petroleum policies of member countries and
the determination of the beat means for safeguarding their inter-
ests, individually and collectively.
(B) The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the
stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to
eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.
(C) Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the
producing nations and- to the necessity of securing a steady income
to the producing countries; an efficient, economic and regular sup-
ply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on their
capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.'
In short, the founders of OPEC were attempting to create a cartel
designed to more effectively interact with oligopolistic nature of the oil
corporations.m
Organizationally, OPEC consists of a series of vertically integrat-
ed committees designed to determine, evaluate, and implement oil eco-
nomic strategy. The highest level of the organization is the Commis-
sion, which consists of only the oil ministers of each of the member
states. The Commission is responsible for the general policy and mem-
bership of the organization. Theoretically, this arrangement allows
OPEC to react expediently to changes in the world oil market. Howev-
er, with the exception of procedural matters, the Commission often
faces delays and disruptions because many of the oil ministers do not
have broad leeway to operate on behalf of their respective govern-
53. ARAMCO is a conglomeration of four U.S. oil corporations.
54. Gulf States, supra note 51, at 4.
55. JOHN EVANS, OPEC, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE WORLD ENERGY MARKET
138 (1986).
56. GHANEM, supra note 24, at 31.
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ments. The Commission's operation is further impeded because it
meets only twice a year, except under extraordinary circumstances."7
At the next level is the Board of Governors, which consists of one
governor for each member country. The Board of Governors is theoreti-
cally responsible for the implementation of the directives of the Com-
mission. Functionally, the Board is a bureaucratic level that adds little
to the performance of the organization as a whole. The Board's execu-
tive function is limited to the submitting to the Commission agendas
that are rarely followed. Administratively, the Board's influence is lim-
ited because it only meets twice a year.' The Board is, however, re-
sponsible for some of OPEC's fiscal operations, such as the annual bud-
get.5
The Secretariat is the next level of OPEC and is the principle
body through which OPEC implements market operations. Over the
years, the structure of the Secretariat has changed markedly. The
Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General and Deputy Secretary.
Both of these posts are filled by unanimous election of a member of the
Board of Governors and consist of only three year terms. As a result,
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary positions have frequently been
filled by political candidates. Accordingly, the Secretariat's effective-
ness depends mainly on the quality of its staff.'
Actual operations within the Secretariat are divided by function
into five departments. The Administrative Department handles person-
nel, budgets, and accounting matters. The Information Department
collects and collates information from each of the member countries for
processing and analysis by the Economics Department. The Technical
Department monitors the technological changes that are relevant to
the industry. The Legal Department reviews changes in existing do-
mestic laws and analyzes their potential effects on the industry. Fi-
nally, the Secretariat uses a number of outside consultants as deemed
necessary by the General Secretary.61
Although not in direct conflict with OPEC, the International Ener-
gy Agency also bears some examination. Twelve basic policy principles
of the IEA were set out during Board meetings in 1977. These twelve
principles focus on two fundamental concepts: the reduction of future
oil imports through conservation and substitution of indigenous oil;
and implementation of alternative means of energy production through
"progressive replacement of oil" with coal, natural gas, and nuclear
power.62
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id. at 38.
59. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 10.
60. SKEET, supra note 23, at 237.
61. O.P.E.C., supra note 39, at 10-11.
62. EVANS, supra note 55, at 163-64.
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Currently, the IEA, which is an autonomous extension of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development, consists of
some twenty member countries. Its policy-making body, the governing
board, is composed of senior representatives from each member coun-
try who determine operation ostensibly by consensus. In cases where
consensus cannot be reached, however, decisions are made by a com-
plex weighted voting system. The U.S., Japan, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom combined hold more than fifty percent of the votes.'
The IEA's Board of Governors oversees five standing groups de-
signed to promote co-operation between member countries. Like OPEC,
two of these groups are oriented towards collection and analysis of
information and technology. The central focus of the other three is to
find ways to reduce oil dependency through cooperation between both
member and non-member states and through a comprehensive emer-
gency oil sharing system."
B. Tin
1. Chronology
Initial attempts at organization of the tin market occurred in 1921
with the "Bandoeng Pool," which was primarily an agreement between
Britain, the Netherlands and their respective colonial interests, the
Malay States and Netherlands' Indies. The Bandoeng Pool, essentially
a buffer stock, enjoyed initial success until its stocks were exhausted
due to insufficient capacity. The pool collapsed in 1925.'
In the 1930's, declining prices caused further attempts to organize
the tin market, such as the tin agreements signed in 1931 and 1933.
These attempts. culminated in the Agreement for the International
Control of Production and Export of Tin, which was signed in 1942.
This agreement created a committee to oversee the production of tin in
the major tin producing states, which at that time included Belgium,
Bolivia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and their associated
colonies, the Belgian-Congo, the Malay States, Malacca, Nigeria, and
the Netherlands' Indies.'
Unfortunately, this agreement was interrupted by the onset of
World War II and the subsequent Japanese control of the Pacific. Mar-
ket control was re-established in the post war period with the first
International Tin Agreement (ITA), which was modeled substantially
after the 1942 accord. Membership of this organization included repre-
sentatives of all the major producing countries but less than half of the
consuming nations. This agreement and its successors continued with
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65. LAW, supra note 2, at 56-57.
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varying success until 1961 when increased prices completely depleted
the buffer stocks of the ITA, and the pool collapsed. 7
In 1964, the third ITA was negotiated and passed under the new-
ly created UNCTAD. This new ITA included a new preamble that
provided for the raising of the price of tin, in addition to the original
objective of price stabilization. Otherwise, this agreement and its even-
tual successor, passed in 1970, were essentially the same in form as
earlier agreements."
The structure of the ITA remained remarkably unchanged until
the collapse of the organization in 1985. Two important observations
may be made regarding the chronology of the ITA. First, the focus of
the ITA changed from stabilization to increased price control with the
ratification of the third ITA in 1965. This change naturally resulted in
disagreement and friction between consuming and producing nations
by the early 1970's. Second, only the fifth ITA included the United
States. This is important because the United States commands an
extensive and strategically important tin reserve and because the U.S.
is the largest tin consuming nation. The United States is generally
supportive of the objectives of the ITA and offers considerable coopera-
tion.'
The ITA was considered by most observers to have been a great
success, even into the 1980's. This evaluation is based on evidence that
the ITA has been able to moderate market fluctuations relatively effec-
tively. However, with respect to increasing tin price levels, the ITA
was largely unsuccessful, and its demise is directly related to its ef-
forts in this area. Since the collapse in the tin market, the ITA contin-
ues only on a provisional level, a situation which is unlikely to change
without substantial reorganization of the ITA and its policy objec-
tives.7"
Further, despite the fact that tin production is overwhelmingly
concentrated in LDCs, that tin is consumed mostly by the industrial-
ized countries, and that price control may have been effective in the
past,7 1 several factors make supply cartelization unlikely in the imme-
diate future. The most important reason is the Western market orien-
tation of the majority of the tin producing countries. In addition, the
benefit of oligopolistic action is uncertain in light of the potential for
economic repercussions and the existence of extensive stockpiles, espe-
67. BARANYAI & MIUS, supra note 6, at 21-22.
68. WuILAM L. BALDWIN, THE WORLD TIN MARKET. POLrTCAL PRICING AND Eco-
NOMIC CoMiPETrmON 86-89 (1983).
69. LAW, supra note 2, at 58.
70. Eric J. McFadden, The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 AM. J. INTL L. 811, 814-15 (1986).
71. KLAUS E. KNORR, STANFORD UNIVRrrY FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TIN
UNDER CONTROL 196 (1945).
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cially within the U.S."
2. Form and Function
Article I of the first ITA stated four objectives for the* organiza-
tion:
(a) To prevent or alleviate widespread unemployment or under-
employment and other serious difficulties which are likely to result
from maladjustments between the supply of and the demand for
tin;
(b) To prevent excessive fluctuations in the price of tin and to
achieve a reasonable degree of stability of price on a basis which
will secure long-term equilibrium between supply and demand;
(c) To ensure adequate supplies of tin at reasonable prices at all
times; and
(d) To provide a framework for the consideration and development
of measures to promote the progressively more economic production
of tin while protecting tin deposits from unnecessary waste or pre-
mature abandonment."'
In short, the original ITA was created to moderate market fluctuations
and to promote the development of new and efficient ways of tin pro-
duction. So long as it maintained these goals, the ITA seems to have
been at least moderately successful, and the relationship between
producers and consumers remained relatively good.74
With the ratification of the third ITA, "renumerative return to
producers" officially became an objective of the ITA. This development
implied long-term price support that was opposed by consuming na-
tions. The result was a general downturn in relations between consum-
ing and producing nations, a situation which was exacerbated during
the fifth ITA by the U.S., which used its influence to keep the ceiling
price of tin at artificially low levels. This policy angered producing
nations because it prevented the implementation of market support at
a time when production costs were consistently rising. Consequently,
disagreements over policy eventually led to the United States' refusal
to sign the ITA during the sixth continuance. 5
The early 1980's was an important era in tin production for sever-
al reasons. First, the Association of Tin Producing Countries was es-
tablished by several of the larger tin producing nations, including
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Zaire.
However, this organization has had only symbolic influence. Second,
72. JOHN THOBURN, MULTINATIONALS, MINING AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF
THE TIN INDusTRY 32 (1981).
73. McFadden, supra note 70, at 817 n.16, citing International Tin Agreement,
1953, Art. I, UN Doc. E/CONF.12/12 (1954).
74. Id. at 818-19.
75. Id. at 822-23.
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the United States withdrew from the agreement in 1982 on the
grounds that the ITA was "subsidizing" tin prices. 6 Third, attempts
by the ITA to maintain "renumerative" price levels on an extended
basis, in conjunction with insufficient funding and rising volumes of
tin exports from non-member states, led to the eventual collapse of the
ITA and massive losses in bad debt in 1985."
Since the Bandoeng Pool, efforts at control of the tin market have
essentially taken the form of buffer pools overseen by a committee
known as the Tin Council. 8 Funding of the pools was made possible
by the collection of compulsory contributions from each of the mem-
bers, in addition to provisions for the collection of additional funds as
necessary. 9 At a more fundamental level, operation of the pool con-
sisted of a complex system of quotas and restrictions combined with
both a price ceiling and floor.' These two levels were set by commit-
tee vote, but, in the past, policy changes have required a near unani-
mous vote of the major producers and consumers due to the "unrealis-
tic" structure of the voting system. Accordingly, ITA operation has
been criticized for being inflexible in its reluctance to change the ceil-
ing and floor to reflect realistic, long-term price levels and changing
market conditions."
Historically, the structure of the ITA has been much less central-
ized than that of OPEC. Most of its operations have traditionally been
spread among various sub-organizations, each of which were individu-
ally responsible to the council, within each of its member states.8 The
Council was comprised of representatives of each of the member na-
tions and was headed by a chairman who had no vote. The Council
also contained numerous committees defined by function. Administra-
tively, the buffer stock was controlled by a Manager, who reported di-
rectly to the Chairman of the Council. However, due to anomalies in
the charter, the manager of the buffer stock seemed to be required to
act both within the bounds of the ITA itself and under the supervision
of the Chairman. In the past, this arrangement has been somewhat
tenuous at times, since these two directives are sometimes at odds.'
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Prior to World War II, coffee exports from Latin America consti-
tuted over ninety percent of the world market. It is not surprising,
then, that the first attempts at control of the coffee market, in the
early 1900's, were made by Brazil. Indeed, Brazil alone controlled over
sixty percent of the market share at that time, and its schemes were
basically national output restriction, so it was able to achieve a mar-
ginal degree of success, especially during lean seasons."
In 1923, Brazil attempted to implement a permanent plan to con-
trol coffee prices. Although the plan was disbanded after the crash of
the coffee market in 1929, it did have several important effects on the
coffee market. First, bumper crops in 1927 and 1929 created enormous
excess stocks that made output reduction difficult - Brazil eventually
burned much of that coffee when it no longer remained storable. Sec-
ond, the artificially high price level maintained during the 1920's
spurred increased planting of coffee plants and production. Since a
coffee plant takes at least five years to begin producing beans, and ten
to twelve years to mature, this increased planting led to systematic
overproduction until World War II. Third, the experiment in price
control of the coffee market exemplified a market pattern of demand
leading to increased productivity and planting, falling prices and con-
trol, artificially high prices and eventual market crash, and culminat-
ing in market stagnancy.' Fourth, Brazil's marketing strategy led to
a severe loss of market share. As a result, since no suitable agreement
could subsequently be reached with other producing countries, Brazil
was forced to abandon its attempts to control the market.'
The first real attempt at international organization of the coffee
market came in 1940 with the International Coffee Agreement (ICoA),
which included Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Peru, and Venezuela, and the United States.The Agreement concerned
the division of the U.S. coffee market using import and export quotas
that focused more on the stabilization than the control of prices. 7
The post-war period coffee market showed all the signs of the
beginning of a new market cycle: initial low production rates of coffee
that interacted well with accumulated stocks of coffee and the general-
ly decreased demand that resulted from the closure of much of the
European market. However, demand and price steadily increased
through early 1949. In the 1950's, a period of intense price increase
84. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 186.
85. LAW, supra note 2, at 40-45.
86. BARANYAI & MiLLS, supra note 6, at 149.
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began, leading to the removal of market controls by the U.S. in 1953.
The removal of these controls, combined with frost scares in 1954,
pushed market prices to record levels. By 1960, however, increased
planting and cultivation efficiency, driven by the high prices, led to
plummeting prices and massive overstocks."
In 1958, coffee prices began to decline, and organizational efforts
began anew and developed piecemeal with the Latin-American Coffee
Agreement. This Agreement was joined by France, Portugal, and their
African colonies in 1959 and by Britain and her African colonies in
1960. Additional marginal producers joined in the next two years,
leading to the ICoA and the formation of the International Coffee Or-
ganization (ICO) in 1962. By 1962, the ICO controlled over ninety five
percent of the world market.'
The imposition of this agreement initially led to both chronically
increasing overstocks and inflated price levels. However, U.S. support
for increased prices declined in the early 1970's, and by early 1972,
differences between producing and consuming nations resulted in the
demise of the Agreement. Until that point, the ICO was generally
considered effective, at least from the standpoint of the coffee produc-
ing countries. In any case, the ICoA was able to produce a sizable
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers over the period during
which it was in effect.'
A review of the market stability factors during the period of 1962-
72 is particularly enlightening with respect to the operation of the
ICO. The period of 1962-68 showed relative cooperation between con-
sumers and producers and can be characterized as a period during
which the central focus of the ICO was market stability. To this end,
the ICO was successful, and market stability increased for those six
years.91 Beginning in 1968, however, the ICO became more concerned
with price control, and dissension between producers and consumers
increased. During the latter period, the ICO's ability to exercise mar-
ket power was at least marginally successful, but it was accompanied
by market instability greater than what would have existed without
the ICO.
The next two ICoA's, signed in 1976 and 1983 respectively, were
largely continuations of the previous arrangements. However, each
contained particular modifications. The imposition of quota systems in
the ICoA of 1976 met substantial opposition both because they con-
tained extensive modifications and because market prices fluctuated
88. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 187.
89. LAW, supra note 2, at 43-44.
90. Id. at 45-46.
91. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 196.
92. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
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widely. Analysis of the agreement of 1983 is important because it has
been largely seen as "an elaborate and advanced attempt to regulate
the market.' s
The U.S. disapproved of the ICO in the 1980's. The U.S. believed
that the ICO artificially maintained high coffee prices and sold coffee
to non-member countries at below market prices. The United States'
dissatisfaction intensified when several large coffee exporting nations
decided to further limit exports in December of 1986." Accordingly,
the U.S. refused to enter into a further ICoA when the 1983 agreement
ended in 1989. With the loss of the support of the largest consuming
nation, the ICO was unable to effectively maintain its quota system,
and the coffee market collapsed. Coffee prices declined rapidly as pro-
ducing countries drastically increased their outputs in order to retain
earnings in the more competitive market."
In response to continually dropping coffee prices in the early
1990's, the first few months of 1993 saw increased pressure from coffee
producing nations for the construction of a new coffee agreement. How-
ever, despite offers of new concessions by the coffee producing nations,
such as banning "below agreement price level" sales of coffee to non-
member countries, a new pact has not been reached for two central
reasons. First, since the present ICO represents fifty two producing
countries, agreement on the distribution of the world market has been
difficult to reach. Second, and far more importantly, continued reluc-
tance on the part of coffee consuming nations, most notably the U.S.,
have stalled completion of a new ICoA."
At first glance, the importance that coffee producers attribute to
creating consensus between producing and consuming nations seems
unwarranted in light of the success of OPEC. There are, however, a
number of teasons why the coffee market is different than that of oil.
The production cycle of coffee cannot effectively be changed in the
short run, so the world supply of coffee is much more difficult to con-
trol than that of oil. Controlling supply is further complicated by the
existence of considerable coffee stocks in the hands of the consuming
nations.' In addition, the relatively large number of coffee producing
nations makes the enforcement of coffee agreements much more diffi-
cult. Indeed, one reason for the initial ability of the ICO to control
coffee prices was consumer cooperation with respect to distribution
93. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 198.
94. Id. at 200.
95. Christina Lamb, A Storm in a Coffee Cup, FINANCIAL TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1992,
at 18.
96. Coffee-Producing Countries Agree on Strategy for Talks with Consuming
Countries, BRTSH BRoADcASTING CoRP., Mar. 16, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Strategy
for Talks], available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
97. Id. at 18.
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quota enforcement.' Finally, the potential for increased coffee prices
does not represent the same threat to industrialized economies that an
increase in the price of oil does. Coffee plays only a very limited role as
a factor of production for other products and can, to a relatively large
extent, be substituted for or done without.
The role of the U.S. in future ICoA's must be characterized as
important but unclear. Without the support of an economically active
ICoA, prices in the coffee market have declined significantly, despite
previous predictions that increases in coffee prices may be close at
hand." As the largest consuming nation, the U.S. imports nearly
twice the coffee of the next largest importer. Thus, U.S. involvement in
a new ICoA could mean substantial U.S. subsidization of world coffee
production, at least in the short run. However, coffee pricing remains a
volatile issue of political importance for the U.S."® Low coffee prices
threaten to lead to social unrest in many coffee producing nations,
which rely heavily on coffee exports to generate export earnings, and
to increased production of the main alternative crop, coca and its re-
fined product, cocaine.'
2. Form and Function
The initial ICoA of 1940 was created "to allocate equitably the
market of the United States of America," and to "take steps to promote
the orderly marketing of coffee, with a view to asserting terms of trade
equitable for both producers and consumers by adjusting supply to
demand.""° These goals were expanded to a global level by the agree-
ment of 1962, which included the following principles:
1. to ensure by a comprehensive and centralized control of exports,
backed up by supervision and regulation of imports, that the gener-
al level of coffee prices does not decline beyond the level of 1962
and that real export earnings should progressively increase;
2. to promote the consumption of coffee (importing members to
have no financial obligation), and to work for the removal of obsta-
cles to consumption (e.g., import tariffs, quotas, etc.);
3. to adjust production with demand within the lifetime of the
agreement;
4. to establish a policy 'relative to' stocks, which producing mem-
bers 'shall endeavour' by all means within their power to imple-
ment."o
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Thus, the ICoA has focused, at least partially, on maintaining a price
above market levels.'
When in force, the ICoA operates through an elaborate system of
import and export quotas that serve to control over ninety percent of
global coffee production. Quotas were chosen because buffer stocks
cannot cope with chronic overproduction problems and large capital re-
quirements. The ICoA enforced the quotas by implementing an exten-
sive system of verification of coffee stocks that helped to prevent cheat-
ing.10°
The system of export and import quotas was designed and moni-
tored by the International Coffee Council (ICC).1" The ICC itself is
made up of representatives from both coffee producing and consuming
nations. Decisions made by the ICC are based on a complicated weight-
ed voting system that provides overall equal voting power to consum-
ing and producing factions. A two-thirds majority is required to im-
plement a quota change. A sixteen member Board aids the Council; the
Board is elected by the Council and oversees the Secretariat. The Sec-
retariat is the central administrative branch of the ICC and is headed
by the Executive Director. The ICC is structured similarly to OPEC,
yet its operations are much different. However, since 1989, the ICC
has operated on a provisional level only.' 7
D. Sugar
1. Chronology
Although global efforts to organize the sugar markets did not
materialize until the 1930's, British efforts to control the sugar mar-
kets began in 1891 with the International London Convention. Subse-
quent agreements were reached primarily between European producers
in the Sugar Convention of 1902."° Although this agreement was
limited in scope, it represented a significant first step in the genera-
tion of future sugar ICA's. By 1920, however, the Sugar Convention
was abandoned for political reasons."
The next major attempt to control the sugar market did not occur
until 1931 when negotiations between Cuba, the United States, and
187 (1963).
104. LAW, supra note 2, at 44.
105. UNCTAD Committee Assesses Role of International Commodity Agreements in
Attaining Integrated Programme Goals; United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, UNITED NATIONS CHRONICLE, Jun. 1985, at 57 [hereinafter UNCTAD].
106. GosovIc, supra note 1, at 229.
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109. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
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Java led to an agreement to restrict output through a system of quo-
tas. Shortly thereafter, similar arrangements were forged between
Cuba, Java, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bel-
gium." ° The "Chadbourne Agreement," as these agreements were col-
lectively called, successfully limited output among the membership
nations. However, this output was quickly replaced by non-member-
ship countries creating, in effect, a transfer of production. With sugar
prices in continual decline, the Chadbourne Agreement was abandoned
in 1935.1
Two years after the initiation of the Chadbourne Agreement, ne-
gotiations towards price stabilization began with the World Monetary
and Economic Conference of 1933. Initial agreement was hampered by
the Chadbourne Scheme, which was still in force. However, by 1937, a
sugar agreement was signed between the governments of South Africa,
Brazil, Belgium, the United Kingdom, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, India, the
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the USSR, the United States,
and Yugoslavia."2 This agreement was unsuccessful in affecting
prices and was interrupted by the onset of World War I.3
By the end of the war, there were shortages and relatively high
prices in the world sugar market; accordingly, the next fifteen years
were characterized by gradually increasing outputs and decreasing
prices. By 1953, prices were low enough to prompt further attempts at
controlling the sugar market. The International Sugar Agreement
(ISA) of 1953 included all major producers (except Brazil and Peru)
and importers, and it operated on the basis of a set of quotas that were
to be enforced by both exporters and importers.""
The 1956 ISA included Brazil and Peru and made several impor-
tant refinements to the quota system. By 1960, however, the agree-
ment faced serious political and functional difficulties, and the ISO
barely moderated wide price fluctuations. In addition, political differ-
ences between the United States and Cuba forced wholesale changes in
the distribution of the quota system. Record production levels world-
wide further strained the quota system, and large landholding in Cuba
became necessary to protect against flucuations." 5 These complica-
tions eventually led to a collapse in the agreement by 1962, as Cuba
withdrew from the world market due to commitments to the Sino-Sovi-
110. EL-GAMAL, supra note 108, at 298-300.
111. BARANYAI & MILTS, supra note 6, at 109.
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Following a decade of violent price swings and changing political
conditions, renegotiation of the agreement was attempted in 1965.
These negotiations stalled due to differences in opinions with respect
to price range targets and export quotas. Agreement was finally
reached in 1968,1' but, during the early 1970's, the ISO was unable
to prevent skyrocketing prices despite considerable increases in both
production and consumption." 8 These high prices created great in-
centives for increased production. Accordingly, world production
boomed and signs of an impending sugar glut arose as the ISA of 1977
went into effect." '
The ISA of 1977 was further burdened by the refusal of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) to join the pact. Although the EEC's
rationale was -largely political, its failure to join the ISA and subse-
quent increases in sugar exportation made attempts by the ISO to
keep sugar within the proscribed price range impossible. In addition,
the continuing development and use of alternative sweeteners exac-
erbated the downward pressure on sugar prices. Consequently, by
1984, when the agreement lapsed, sugar prices fell precipitously in the
face of huge global surpluses."s
Since 1984, the ISO has been relegated to the non-market role of
continuously monitoring the sugar market, and it has no ability to
perform market operations. Accordingly, controversy has surrounded
the ISA's adoption in 1987" and 1992. Currently, the ISO provides a
forum for discussion about issues concerning the sugar market and
supplies comprehensive statistics on the functioning of the market.
However, the ISO has diminished in importance as an economic actor,
and it is unlikely to recover, at least in the near future."=
2. Form and Function
At least since the end of World War II, International Sugar Agree-
ments have been oriented towards the goals of stability and the provi-
sion of renumerative returns to sugar producing nations. Evidence of
116. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 121-22.
117. Gosovic, supra note 1, at 99-101.
118. LAW, supra note 2, at 50-51.
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122. Nigel Hunt, New Pact Secures Future for International Sugar Organization,
REUTER ASIA-PACiIC BUSINESS REPORT, Jan. 20, 1993, at 2, available in LEXIS,
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the goals were clearly set out by the International Sugar Agreement of
1958:
The objectives of this Agreement are to assure supplies of sugar to
importing countries and markets for sugar to exporting countries at
equitable and stable prices; to increase the consumption of sugar
throughout the world; and to maintain the purchasing power in
world markets of countries or areas whose economies are largely
dependent upon the production or export of sugar by providing ade-
quate returns to producers and making it possible to maintain fair
standards of labour conditions and wages.'
Later agreements echoed these objectives.' In the long run, howev-
er, any claims of success regarding these objectives, other than stabi-
lizing prices,' must be viewed with suspicion.'
As with coffee, the ISO's market control mechanism took the form
of a system of quotas designed to keep prices within a pre-determined
range. Buffer stock arrangements in this area have long been consid-
ered infeasible due to the size of sugar price fluctuations and the enor-
mous amount of capital that would be required to implement a pool.
The most recent attempts at price control failed both because of the
large non-member production of the EEC, currently estimated at about
twenty five percent of world production, and chronic overproduction
around the rest of the world.'7
The ISO of 1937 provided for the creation of a "General Council,
composed of delegates representing all of the contracting governments,
and an Executive Committee of nine members, which are to administer
the agreement through a Secretariat to be established in London." ' 8
The Executive Committee consisted of equal representation of the
sugar importing countries, the cane-sugar producing countries, and the
beet-sugar producing countries. Permanent seats on this committee
were held by the United States, the United Kingdom, Cuba, the Neth-
erlands, and Java.' Subsequent ISO's have continued to utilize this
structure with only minor changes,"8 the most important of which
was the addition of the Finance Committee. The decline in importance
of the ISA has, however, had a corresponding effect at the administra-
tive level, as is illustrated by the merger of the Finance and Executive
123. United Nations Sugar Conference, 1956: Summary of Proceedings, at 53, U.N.
Doc. E/Conf.22/7/Annex H [hereinafter Sugar Conference].
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Committees into one Administrative Committee in 1993.131
IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to make accurate generalizations about commodity
markets because of the degree of variation between markets. As a
result, analysis of the ability of actors to effectively form and maintain
an ICA must necessarily be limited to the provision of factors that bear
on the effectiveness of ICA's. These factors can be loosely separated
into market, commodity, and organization specific factors, as outlined
below.
A. Market Factors
International Trade Agreements do not work in a vacuum. Each
commodity market has important differences and unique attributes
that affect any attempted ICA in that particular market. These attrib-
utes may even prevent an ICA from effectively functioning in certain
markets. Relevant market attributes include the following:
1. The number of producing and consuming entities;
2. Political and functional stability and organization of these entities;
3. Barriers to entry;
4. The degree of variation in international costs of production;
5. The relative "importance" of a product both in the world economy
and individual markets;
6. The degree and severity of price fluctuations; and
7. Demand and supply elasticities.
First, the fewer entities involved in a market, the more effective
an ICA is likely to be. Negotiations are easier to conduct, agreements
are easier to construct, and enforcement is less difficult. For instance,
OPEC's ability to effect control of the oil market was directly related to
the concentration of previous control within the hands of a small group
of multinational corporations. 2 Conversely, the number of producers
and actors involved in the tin market undoubtedly had a negative
effect on the ITA_"
Second, the political and functional positions of each of the eco-
nomic actors can have a positive or negative effect. For instance, the
British colonial system undoubtedly aided the preservation of unity of
131. See, Hunt, supra note 122, at 2 (noting the merger of the Finance and Exec-
utive Committees).
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the ITA until 1985.184 In addition, the larger the economic entity, the
greater the impact on a particular market. This is especially true for
the Western industrialized countries that enjoy large GNP's and al-
ready trade extensively with one another.'
Third, the ability to control market price depends directly on the
ICA's ability to prevent new sources of production from entering the
market place. A prime example of this is the oil industry. OPEC was
assisted in its efforts to raise prices by the high initial investment
costs required for oil production and the relative scarcity of known oil
deposits. In addition, OPEC's relative decline in power since the early
1970's is directly related to the discovery and exploitation of new oil
deposits.1
The degree of variation in international production costs and the
importance of the product both affect the degree to which the various
producers of a commodity can be enticed to form, make, or agree to an
ICA. If the costs of production vary greatly between producers, then
low cost producers will have to be compensated to a larger extent for
giving up their comparative advantage. Since the price maintained by
the ICA must be higher than the highest cost producer, the incentive
for the low cost producer to cheat is likely to be higher in cases where
there is a large differential between low and high cost producers. Nat-
urally, it is the high cost producers, such as Venezuela in OPEC, who
often initiate the process of creating an ICA.1"'
Similarly, countries that rely heavily on a particular product are
likely to be more interested in the formation of an ICA than countries
who are less dependent on the commodity. In addition, the ICA's abili-
ty to effectively punish a cheating country will decline as a function of
the dependency on the export of the particular commodity."
Wide fluctuations in the price that the ICA is attempting to con-
trol can make the operation of an ICA much more difficult. Price
fluctuations and their subsequent effect on the economies of the pro-
ducing nations is frequently cited as a central justification for the
creation of ICA's: the larger the fluctuations in the target commodity
price, the greater the need for and the cost of some type of commodity
control. However, the larger the price fluctuations a commodity experi-
ences, the greater the capital and commodity stock requirements
are.139 In addition, failure of an ICA can have serious international
economic consequences, as is illustrated by the collapse of the ITA in
134. Id. at 816.
135. SiDNEY DELL, TRADE BLocs AND COMMON MARKET 220 (1963).
136. AHRARI, supra note 25, at 193, 203.
137. SKEET, supra note 23, at 2.
138. Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collu-
sion, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 295, 303 (1987).




Finally, demand elasticity is important because it measures the
degree to which a change in supply will impact demand. Therefore,
since the operation of an ICA is integrally involved with the regulation
of supply and the price level, the elasticity of demand is critical in
determining how effective an ICA can be. In general, the less elastic a
commodity is in terms of demand, the more effective an ICA will be at
controlling price. Comparing oil and coffee illustrates this difference.
Since the demand for oil is relatively inelastic, OPEC was able to de-
mand high prices in the early 1970's by restricting supply.' 4 In con-
trast, the demand for coffee is more elastic, so the shortages experi-
enced during the 1950's led to dramatic declines in consumption, rath-
er than prolonged increases in price.""
B. Commodity Factors
The particular attributes of the specific commodity profoundly
affect the ability of an ICA to control market prices. Many of these
elements are important because they affect the supply of the particular
commodity:
1. The renewability and scarcity of the commodity;
2. The storability of the commodity;
3. Crop or production cycles;
4. The ratio of variable to fixed costs;
5. The susceptibility to outside influences such as the weather; and
6. The extent and availability of substitutes.
First, the renewability of the product affects supply as a barrier to
entry into the market. For instance, the scarcity of oil clearly helped
OPEC to effectively control oil prices,' while the relative ease of
growing sugar, especially among traditional sugar importing countries
such as the U.S., creates a natural limitation on the degree to which
the ISO can exercise oligopolistic power.'" Indeed, renewability may
even prevent an ICA from acting oligopolistically at all.'"
Second, the storability of the product is important because it di-
rectly affects the ability of an ICA to control the supply of a product.
This factor is much less important with respect to non-agricultural
140. SKEET, supra note 23, at 85.
141. LAW, supra note 2, at 42.
142. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 79.
143. LAW, supra note 2, at 46.
144. See BEHRMAN, supra note 12, at 17 (providing an in-depth economic analysis
of this concept).
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products, such as tin or oil, because these commodities may be either
left in the ground or stored indefinitely once extracted. However, with
agricultural products, natural decay both increases storage costs and
limits storage life.
Third, production cycles, especially with respect to agricultural
products, limits the ability of an ICA to control supply. For example,
coffee plants require ten years to reach full maturity. The ability of
producing nations to expand or contract coffee output quickly is ex-
tremely limited. Sugar, on the other hand, can be harvested the same
season it is planted. However, the shorter season for sugar has provid-
ed no advantage to the ISO because sugar plants can often be harvest-
ed only once. Output, therefore, is difficult to predict far in ad-
vance.14
Fourth, the ratio of variable to fixed costs affects the incentives
that the market provides to the individual producers of goods. For
example, both oil and coffee require extensive initial investment in
order to establish production. Investors in these areas naturally spread
the cost of this investment over the period of yield, even though the
entire investment is made prior to any return. However, producers of
these commodities are likely to consider only the variable costs when
determining the size of periodic levels of production. Therefore, excep-
tionally low prices are required to curtail production in the short run,
so prices that would normally be expected to negatively impact supply
will be less likely to change production. In addition, the lack of respon-
siveness to market signals makes the use of a buffer stock alone par-
ticularly difficult because of the increased capital required to combat
the likelihood of wide price fluctuations.'"
Fifth, weather often affects the availability of certain commodities.
An excellent example of this is coffee, which is particularly susceptible
to changes in supply due to frost. In 1953, for example, one particular-
ly damaging frost raised coffee prices by six percent.' 7
Sixth, the availability of viable substitutes greatly impacts an
ICA's ability to control supply. Without question, the relative "unique-
ness" of oil is one factor responsible for OPEC's success in controlling
prices.'" Conversely, readily available sugar substitutes have un-
doubtedly hurt the ISA's attempts to regulate the sugar market."9
145. LAW, supra note 2, at 40, 46.
146. Success of UNCTAD Common Fund Hinges Upon Commodity Price Supports,
ICA Heads Agree, [Current Reports] Intl Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 25 at 820 (Jun. 19,
1985) [hereinafter Success].
147. LAW, supra note 2, at 41-42.
148. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 79.
149. Robin Stainer, Commodities and Futures: Sugar Organization in Danger, IN-
DEPENDENT, Jul. 13, 1992, at 22, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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C. ICA Organization Factors
The effectiveness of an international agreement depends primarily
on two factors. First, the construction and operation of an economic
system requires that the parties involved hold common interests and
values. Second, there must be general agreement on the objectives of
the political system. ' Translation of these concepts to International
Commodity Agreements has yielded various results. For instance,
Baranyai and Mills suggest that the achievement of continuing success
by an ICA depends on
1) participation by the principle producing and consuming coun-
tries, combined with some reasonable pressure to induce outsiders
to cooperate;
2) governmental management through an administrative board
representing the interests of both producers and consumers;
3) adequate power to control the volume of output so as to ensure a
remunerative price to producers and a sufficiently free flow of com-
modities to the consumers; [and]
4) measures to encourage efficient production and discourage un-
economical operations.'
These elements seem to indicate that the success of an ICA depends
primarily upon its members and the strength of their combined power
in the world market.
"Group B," a committee of delegates from the industrially devel-
oped countries, identified different elements:
1) realistic and market related price ranges;
2) adequate provisions for adjusting price ranges in accordance
with shifts in the underlying market trends;
3) effective economic provisions (in cases where stabilization mea-
sures were deemed feasible and desirable); and
4) support and participation of as many important producing and
consuming countries as possible.l
These factors contrast sharply with those suggested by Baranyai and
Mills because they focus primarily on the operation, management, and
objectives.
Reconciling these two formulas is not as difficult as might be
supposed. Without adequate cooperation between member nations, ef-
fective operation becomes impossible. Thus, the correct constituency
becomes a prerequisite for an effective ICA. Yet even with full support
initially, focusing on achieving objectives that are not desired by a
powerful faction of the ICA can often lead to the destruction of the
150. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 5.
151. BARANYAI & MILLS, supra note 6, at 26.
152. UNCTAD, supra note 105, at 55-56.
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agreement. Therefore, operation within the interests of the full mem-
bership is also a prerequisite. As a result, to be successful in the long
term, an ICA must contain the right members and pursue policy objec-
tives that the full constituency desires.
This is not to say that a group of either producing or consuming
nations acting alone cannot effectively use an ICA to influence a mar-
ket. There is no question that certain ICA's, most notably OPEC, have
had profound influences on their individual markets. However, at-
tempts to raise prices through collusion generally tend to produce
confrontational situations between producers and consumers. Main-
taining the ICA then becomes even more difficult because implement-
ing the four elements above unilaterally is far more difficult than a
bilateral operation and also because market conditions eventually tend
to shift in favor of the "other side," which can then exert pressure for
change.
In addition, the ability of an ICA to control prices effectively de-
pends heavily on its ability to control commodity supply. However, the
ability of an ICA to control supply is limited for several reasons. First,
with respect to food, demand curves are relatively inelastic, so an in-
crease in price will have only a small effect on demand since food is a
primary item that people must have. It does not follow, however, that
demand curves will be inelastic for individual commodities because a
rise in the price of a single commodity may lead to the substitution of
others."
Second, the creation of an artificially high price naturally creates
incentives for each member of the ICA to cheat. This is especially true
for countries in dire economic straits since the monetary gains for
breaching the ICA are likely to be substantial, and the restriction of
output will often result in production surpluses. From the ICA's point
of view, this problem is exacerbated by the relatively ineffective pun-
ishment measures it can exercise, especially if the breaching party is a
major actor."5
Third, an increase in prices brought about by ICA action is likely
to provoke a variety of negative responses from consuming nations.
Increased prices are likely to speed up the search for suitable substi-
tutes and motivate consumers to impose conservation measures. In
addition, consuming countries may attempt to find relief through in-
ternational anti-trust measures, an area of law that is steadily expand-
ing.1" Further, prolonged periods of prices above market level are
153. LAW, supra note 2, at 3-5.
154. But see, Ayres, supra note 138 (discussing enforcement measures a cartel can
use to enforce its decisions).
155. Deanna Conn, Note, Assessing the Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements
and New Rules of Origin on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to
International Mergers, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 128-29 (1993).
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likely to provide incentives for the consuming countries to form their
own ICA's to attempt to mitigate the effects of price control."s
It is interesting to note that neither of the two sets of criteria
listed above mentions the organizational structure of the ICA as a
factor involved in success. A comparison of the industries outlined
above, particularly when OPEC is compared to the relatively ineffec-
tive ICO, seems to support that omission. Indeed, an ICA's choice of
structure seems to play a minor role in the ability of that ICA to par-
ticipate effectively in the market place.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, these factors indicate that ICA's may effectively
provide market stabilization measures, even in the long run. However,
most ICA's have been relatively unsuccessful in controlling prices,
largely because of political differences among their constituents and
the inability to effectively control global supply.157 Furthermore, at-
tempts at global market and price controls have frequently resulted in




During the early 1970's, some commentators predicted that a
"New Era" was beginning in the commodity markets. These commenta-
tors were encouraged by the ability of some ICA's, especially OPEC, to
successfully control market prices. In addition, the high rates of infla-
tion globally combined with relative scarcity of commodities led to
decreased bargaining power by consuming nations and a corresponding
increase in commodity prices.' This initial success led many Lesser
Developed Countries (LDC's) to view ICA's as a means of altering the
global economic order. At the same time, the Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), made by the
Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, called for changes
in global economic structure and a general redistribution of the world's
156. LAW, supra note 2, at 78.
157. Given the theoretical framework outlined above, a logical next step would be
an econometric analysis to determine the relative importance and validity of the
factors listed. Construction of a model of this nature is beyond the scope of this
Note. In addition, an econometric model may not prove useful because of problems
obtaining relevant data, the incompatibility of some of the factors for conversion into
a numerical form, and the large number of theoretically relevant factors, which is
likely to lead to regression multi-colinearity. As a result, this study will have to rely
on the authorities cited and the logical connection of each of the factors to the actu-
al experience of the commodities.
158. C. FRED BERGSTEN, TOWARD A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF C. FRED BERGSTEN, 1972-74, at 287-88, 294 (1975).
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wealth."' 9 The combination of these two concepts found expression
most clearly in the resolutions of the "Group of 77" and UNCTAD. 1
Yet even in the 1970's, during the pinnacle of ICA support, the
propriety of the use of ICA's as the vehicle to promote redistribution of
wealth was by no means universally accepted. As Lincoln Gordon
wrote,
[i]nternationally managed commodity markets do not hold out a
true prospect of huge additional foreign exchange earnings or re-
source transfers to the developing countries. They cannot substitute
for the internal structural changes that are at the core of real de-
velopment."'
Today, this view is endorsed by the majority of commentators, al-
though some have predicted a re-emergence of ICA's, at least in some
commodity markets.1'
B. The Decline of ICA's
ICA's are slowly disappearing from commodity markets and being
replaced by free market forces. Indeed, only two ICA's still conduct
market operations in substantial commodity markets, both of which
must be considered special cases. First, OPEC has survived, at least in
name, due to the unique and important nature of oil. However, inter-
national economies, market structure,'" and political considerations
make its future unclear. Second, the International Rubber Organiza-
tion (IRO) has been able to continue market operations largely because
of the increased demand for condoms and rubber gloves caused by the
AIDS crisis.'"
One major reason for the decline of ICA's has been a general de-
cline in support for them within the industrialized countries. The col-
lapse of the Tin Agreement in 1985 resulted in extensive bank losses
and greatly impacted the reputation of commodity pacts."e In addi-
tion, industrialized countries have increasingly seen commodity agree-
159. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 28-30.
160. LAW, supra note 2, at 17.
161. Lincoln Gordon, Natural Resources and the International Economic Order, in
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 45, 55 (Don Wallace, Jr.
& Helga Escobar eds., 1977).
162. ARAIM, supra note 8, at 213-15.
163. FADmL J. AL-CHALABI, OPEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY: A
CHANGING STRUCTURE 2-6 (1980).
164. Greg McCune, International Commodity Accords Face Hard Times, REUTER
Busnmss REPORT, Sep. 1, 1988, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid
File.
165. Jane Merriman, Outlook Bleak for Commodity Stabilization Pacts, REUTER




ments as mere vehicles for the transfer of development aid, as opposed
to true efforts at market stabilization. Claims that ICA's are not prac-
tical due to enforcement problems further buttress this view.' ICA's
may even exacerbate existing market problems," 7 and they require
capital investment that far exceeds the benefit they yield.'
ICA's have also been criticized on the grounds that they promote
inefficient resource allocation because their decisions are most often
based on political or past production rationales rather than on objec-
tive market analysis.'" Examples include the failure of the tin agree-
ment to adjust its price levels in response to long term market condi-
tions, the political wrangling in the coffee market, and even the agen-
da of some of the proposals of UNCTAD.
Nonetheless, some commentators believe that ICA's may have a
future regulating international commodity markets, perhaps even
through mere price stabilization efforts.170 However, should recent
trends continue, even modest advancements are unlikely unless the
LDC's gain more realistic views of the current commodity markets.'
C. Conclusions
The prevailing trend in world commodity markets away from
ICA's is likely to impact the global structure in several important
ways. First, since ICA's have constituted an important part of plans for
the NIEO for several decades, the failure of ICA's in general may
cause changes in the strategy and means by which UNCTAD and other
world organizations attempt to implement the NIEO. Second, the
disappearance of ICA's may affect the degree of stability in world com-
modity markets. Third, multinational corporations and other non-gov-
ernmental organizations are likely to play an increasingly important
role in commodity markets.
Even a cursory analysis of the world economy reveals a continuing
need for support of the LDC's. This remains true particularly since
falling commodity prices has significantly affected the ability of many
LDC's to maintain levels of export earnings."7 Falling prices have
166. Commodity Pacts More Oriented Towards Market, REUTERS, Mar. 31, 1987, at
6 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; see also, Ayres, supra note 138
(discussing cartel enforcement).
167. Success, supra note 146, at 820.
168. Agreements in Decay, supra note 10, at 1.
169. LAW, supra note 2, at 111.
170. Success, supra note 146, at 820.
171. Robin Stainer, Commodities & Futures: Producers and Consumers Start to
Focus on the Pacts, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 6, 1992, at 19, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File.
172. Gordon, supra note 161, at 55.
173. UNCTAD, supra note 105, at 55.
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led, in turn, to increased pressure by LDC's for greater participation
by industrialized nations in the construction of ICA's.
Prior to examining the potential for alternatives to ICA's that may
warrant consideration in the future, two important points must be
discussed. The fundamental role of such a mechanism must be deter-
mined. As discussed above, the goals of ICA's tend to go beyond mere
price stabilization. Indeed, LDC's tend to see ICA's as mechanisms to
control the markets of the commodity they sell and to enhance the
wealth they receive from those products. In short, LDC's are really
looking for greater economic participation in the market place. 74
Second, the goal of price stability has been placed at center stage
in many of the negotiations concerning ICA's. Ironically, general agree-
ment exists among industrialized and developing countries that in-
creased stability of commodity markets would be beneficial.'75 For the
industrialized countries, stability is important because they continue to
produce the vast majority of the world's commodity supply.' For
LDC's, stability is important because even though the aggregate quan-
tity they export is relatively limited, the income generated by these
primary products represents a significant proportion of their overall in-
come. 1
77
Without ICA's, instability within commodity markets is likely to
increase. First, it is clear that ICA's contributed, at least to a limited
degree, to the stability of some commodity markets. Second, since
many of the LDC's are "fringe" suppliers to the world economy, market
instability is more likely to be reflected in demand for their goods. For
example, since the U.S. both produces and imports sugar, a decline in
sugar demand is likely to mean a decline in imports rather than pro-
duction. 7 ' Third, increased "regionalization" is likely to result in
"minilateral" trade agreements that are likely to place LDC's even
more on the fringe. For example, agreements within the EEC are likely
to lock out at least some of the LDC trade to Western European Na-
tions.1
79
One way in which LDC's can and do continue to seek improve-
ment in the global economy is through the UNCTAD, which has been
uniformly committed to the development of LDC's and to improving
174. Stephen D. Krasner, United Nations and Political Conflict Between North
and South, in THE US, THE UN, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF GLOBAL CHANGE 210,
212-13 (Toby T. Gati ed., 1983).
175. Success, supra note 146, at 820; see also, LAW, supra note 2, at 105-06
(discussing instability).
176. LAw, supra note 2, at 11.
177. Gordon, supra note 161, at 51.
178. SHAILENDRA J. ANJARIA ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEVELOP-
MENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY 52 (1982).
179. Id. at 33.
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their terms of trade. As a result, UNCTAD has been an avid supporter
of ICA's and has frequently provided a forum for their negotiations as
well as for the Integrated Programme for Commodities.' ° UNCTAD's
attitude towards commodity pacts continues to be favorable. However,
in the face of declining popularity of ICA's among the more industrial-
ized countries, UNCTAD has begun to focus more heavily on the opera-
tions of LDC's in the market place and on possible free market related
solutions to the LDC plight.18 '
The keystone of UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodi-
ties is the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), a large money pool
earmarked for use for financing buffer stock arrangements and for
enhancing the long term competitiveness and development prospects
for various commodities."2 Financing for the CFC requires contribu-
tion from industrialized and developing nations as well as regional
groups such as OPEC.'" Nonetheless, plans for the completion of the
CFC have run into difficulties similar to those experienced by other
ICA's, and prospects for final ratification look bleak.'8
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is another
forum allowing LCD's to improve their position vis-a-vis the industrial-
ized world. GATT seeks the expansion of free trade and the lowering of
trade barriers, goals which have recently been endorsed by the seg-
ments of the industrialized nations that are most interested in the
development of LDC's. However, some scholars have argued that fun-
damental discrimination exists within the structure of the free market
itself. If they are correct, then the free market alone is unlikely to
provide solutions to the LDC problem."
Finally, some potential exists for regional integration to help pro-
vide solutions to the trade problems of the LDC's. In certain cases -
ASEAN, for example - regional integration has provided a more sta-
ble framework of trade, opportunities for economies of scale, and in-
creased specialization, that has benefitted the region generally. Howev-
er, the potential for regionalization is limited for several reasons. The
political diversity between LDC's in many regions makes the process of
integration more difficult. In addition, natural obstacles, combined
with geographical dispersion, make integration difficult, especially for
the LDC's that have little to invest in domestic infrastructure.'
The decline in the importance of ICA's is likely to result in in-
180. Gordon, supra note 161, at 58.
181. Adrian Croft, UNCTAD Seeks More Open Commodities Markets, REUTERS,
Feb. 18, 1992, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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creased importance of other international organizations, especially in
light of the continual decline in U.S. strength. 8 In particular, non-
governmental organizations are likely to play an increasingly impor-
tant role, especially within the operations of the United Nations.'"
Private agents of international trade, such as multinational corpora-
tions, which already exercise extensive power in the international
commodity market, are likely to increase in significance."' Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that the decline in the economic
strength of the U.S. may present opportunities for increased bilateral
trade with the Third World." °
From a global perspective, it is difficult to see who benefits from
this, but scholars disagree. On one hand, it is clear that the host coun-
try receives more direct benefit, especially in terms of usage of labor,
than the home country.9 Multinational corporations may also pro-
vide access to markets that would not otherwise be open to the host
country.
On the other hand, the home country of a multinational corpora-
tion clearly benefits, not only monetarily through stockholder benefits
and indirect taxation but also with respect to increased commodity
control. Indeed, the political importance of the link between the home
government and the multinational corporation has been a central
source of discontent within the LDC's,1" many of which have sought
to increase their control of the means of production in recent years. 93
In any case, the role of multinational corporations in the world
commodity markets has been ignored for too long. Just as charges that
these corporations are merely the agents of their home countries seem
simplistic, arguments that multinational corporate presence can only
be beneficial to a host country should be regarded with skepticism.
More likely, multinational corporations act to maximize their own
utility, so they represent separate and independent economic ac-
tors. " It seems odd, then, that multinational corporations have not
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been included more in formal attempts to organize the commodity
markets. Considering the power that multinational corporations exert
over commodity markets, the failure to include them may be a crucial
factor in the general lack of success of ICA's.
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